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Abortion and 
Compelled  
Physician Speech
David Orentlicher
As states increasingly impose informed consent mandates on abortion providers, the required disclosures bring two well-established legal 
doctrines into conflict — the First Amendment’s 
freedom of speech and the physician’s duty to obtain 
informed consent.
On one hand, the First Amendment provides for 
a broad freedom of speech, under which govern-
ment may neither prevent people from voicing their 
own views, nor compel individuals to voice the gov-
ernment’s views. As the Supreme Court observed in 
Wooley v. Maynard,1 the First Amendment protects 
“both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain 
from speaking at all.”2 When legislatures tell physi-
cians what they must disclose to their patients, the 
physicians lose their right not to speak.
On the other hand, legislatures and courts can insist 
that physicians properly explain to patients about 
their medical conditions and potential treatments 
so patients can make informed decisions about their 
health care. Patients lack the medical expertise neces-
sary to make informed decisions on their own; hence, 
the law requires physicians to disclose material infor-
mation to patients as part of the decision making pro-
cess. Physicians are free to speak or not to speak out-
side of their professional roles. But when taking care 
of patients, doctors assume a duty to speak, as well as 
a duty to speak responsibly.3
The duty of physicians to speak to their patients has 
unique features, but it also has much in common with 
the duties of other professionals to speak to those with 
whom they have a fiduciary relationship. For example, 
under Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.4, law-
yers must “promptly inform” clients of decisions for 
which client consent is required,4 they must keep cli-
ents “reasonably informed” about the status of their 
representation,5 and they must explain matters “to 
the extent reasonably necessary” for clients “to make 
informed decisions regarding the representation.”6 
Similarly, the Uniform Trust Code requires trustees 
to keep beneficiaries “reasonably informed about the 
administration of the trust and of the material facts 
necessary for them to protect their interests.”7 Trustees 
also must provide to the beneficiaries at least once a 
year “a report of the trust property, liabilities, receipts, 
and disbursements, including the source and amount 
of the trustee’s compensation, a listing of the trust 
assets and, if feasible, the market value of the trust’s 
assets.”8
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Ordinarily, the doctrines of free speech and informed 
consent coexist without much difficulty. Courts rarely 
feel the need to discuss the First Amendment implica-
tions of informed consent mandates.9 
But as states have expanded the kinds of informa-
tion that abortion providers must disclose to pregnant 
women, First Amendment concerns have become 
increasingly salient. Indeed, in 2011, a three-judge 
panel on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit struck down part of an informed consent man-
date from the South Dakota legislature on the ground 
that it violated the free speech rights of physicians.10 
Under the South Dakota law, physicians are required 
to disclose “all known medical risks” of abortion, 
including the existence of an “[i]ncreased risk of sui-
cide ideation and suicide.”11 Because studies have not 
found that having an abortion increases the risk for 
suicide, the court concluded that the provision “vio-
lates doctors’ First Amendment right to be free from 
compelled speech that is untruthful, misleading, or 
irrelevant.”12 While the court’s decision was reversed 
by an en banc decision of the Eighth Circuit,13 the 
mandate raises serious concerns. In this article, I will 
use several examples of informational mandates or 
other required physician speech to identify principles 
for distinguishing between legitimate regulation of 
the informed consent process and illegitimate inter-
ference with the freedom of speech.14
Courts and other scholars have suggested a num-
ber of bases for distinguishing between permissible 
and impermissible health mandates. For example, as 
the Eighth Circuit observed, physicians should not be 
compelled to deliver untruthful speech.15 Courts and 
commentators also have worried about speech that 
is too graphic16 or that is designed to manipulate the 
patient’s decision making.17
Perhaps, the best way to conceptualize the problem 
is to view the doctrine of informed consent as a carve-
out from standard First Amendment doctrine.18 As 
long as the state is mandating speech that serves the 
goals of informed consent, the requirements should 
not raise First Amendment concerns. However, when 
the mandates deviate from informed consent princi-
ples, they should receive the usual “strict scrutiny” for 
laws that compel speech by individuals and ordinarily 
be struck down.19
In practice, this conceptualization results in two 
rules that typify much of the analysis in judicial deci-
sions and academic commentary. First, abortion 
speech mandates should be permissible when they 
provide material information to patients about the 
abortion decision. If the state is trying to ensure that 
patients are fully informed, the mandates should be 
allowed. As a corollary, the information must be truth-
ful and not be misleading.20 The goal is to inform not 
to misinform. Second, speech mandates that pertain 
to the morality of abortion should not be permitted. 
Rather than informing the patient’s decision, these 
mandates force the physician or other health profes-
sional to espouse the state’s ideology.21
As indicated, courts and legal scholars have pro-
posed other ways to distinguish permissible from 
impermissible mandates. However, these additional 
distinctions raise their own concerns and should not 
be needed. If courts strictly apply the requirements 
that compelled speech pertain to medical facts about 
abortion and its alternatives rather than abortion ide-
ology and that the compelled speech be truthful and 
not misleading, then the interests of pregnant women 
and their physicians should be protected.
Informed Consent Mandates in Health Care
While many of the legislative mandates for abortion 
informed consent are problematic, some concerns 
about “abortion exceptionalism” are misplaced. Crit-
ics often worry that abortion is singled out for special 
treatment,22 but informed consent statutes in health 
care are not unique to abortion. Legislatures have 
imposed disclosure requirements for several other 
medical decisions.
In the late 1970s and 1980s, concern about breast 
cancer treatment led a number of states to impose 
informed consent mandates on physicians.23 The con-
cern arose over the extent to which surgeons were rec-
ommending radical mastectomy for early stage can-
cers without suggesting that their patients consider 
the breast-conserving alternative of a lumpectomy, 
typically followed by radiation.24 In other words, if 
the cancer were still small and localized, the surgeon 
could remove the tumor and a small amount of sur-
rounding tissue rather than removing the entire 
breast. To ensure that women understand their treat-
ment options, many state legislatures adopted statutes 
requiring greater disclosure of information to patients 
about the alternative treatments.25
These mandates do not raise meaningful First 
Amendment concerns. It is reasonable for the state 
to ensure that patients are fully informed about their 
treatment options, especially when patients are deal-
ing with a treatment that can be disfiguring and a dis-
ease that could be lethal. 
Supporters of abortion speech mandates make a 
similar argument. Before women undergo abortion, it 
is important that they truly understand their repro-
ductive options, especially since the choice of abortion 
means that the fetus will not survive.26
But are there important differences between the 
breast cancer mandates and the abortion mandates? 
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For example, the abortion speech mandates seem 
much more specific than the breast cancer mandates 
about the information that should be disclosed. At one 
time, the Supreme Court worried that rigid require-
ments to disclose a specific body of information would 
impose an “uncomfortable straitjacket” on physicians 
performing abortions.27 If one looks just at the statu-
tory text for the mandates, it appears that legislatures 
mandate a much greater degree of specificity for abor-
tion than for breast cancer treatment. While the abor-
tion mandates often prescribe a detailed “script” for 
physicians,28 breast cancer statutes typically reiterate 
the basic doctrine of informed consent. For example, 
a California statute simply requires that patients be 
informed about “the advantages, disadvantages, risks, 
and descriptions of the procedures with regard to 
medically viable and efficacious alternative methods 
of treatment for breast cancer.”29 However, the stat-
ute also requires physicians to satisfy their disclosure 
requirements by giving patients a brochure developed 
by the California Department of Public Health.30 The 
current version of the brochure provides 35 pages of 
information to patients.31 Other states have even longer 
informational brochures for breast cancer patients,32 
although these states may not require physicians to 
use the brochure but instead may state that the bro-
chure satisfies the physician’s duty of disclosure.33
There is an important way in which the breast 
cancer statutes differ from the abortion mandates. 
Although the breast cancer statutes were enacted 
to encourage greater use of breast-conserving treat-
ment, they generally represent less of an effort to push 
the patient’s decision in one direction or another.34 
While the breast cancer laws require disclosure of 
information regarding all of the treatment options, 
the abortion statutes typically emphasize informa-
tion about the risks of abortion and the benefits of 
childbirth.35
Still, abortion speech mandates are not the only 
speech mandates that promote one decision over 
another. For example, most states in the 1980s 
enacted provisions for “required request” to increase 
the number of organ transplants. Required request 
laws applied to patients who died in a hospital, were 
suitable candidates for organ donation, and did not 
decide about posthumous organ donation while alive. 
For these patients, a hospital representative36 was 
required to inform family members about their option 
to authorize donation and also to request the family 
to consent to donation. So speech was compelled, and 
it was compelled with a bias. Hospital personnel not 
only would inform family members about organ dona-
tion, they also would push for a decision to donate.37
For an example of another kind of informed con-
sent mandate that gets fairly specific and that evinces 
a bias (in this case against the proposed treatment), 
consider requirements for consent to electroconvul-
sive treatment (ECT) for major depression or other 
psychiatric disorders. About 40 percent of states have 
such mandates.38 Under Colorado’s statute, physicians 
must notify patients about
The nature, degree, duration, and probability 
of the side effects and significant risks of [ECT] 
commonly known by the medical profession, 
especially noting the possible degree and dura-
tion of memory loss, the possibility of permanent 
irrevocable memory loss, and the remote possi-
bility of death.39
Patients also must be told about “reasonable alterna-
tive treatments and why the physician is recommend-
ing electroconvulsive treatment” and that “there is a 
difference of opinion within the medical profession on 
the use of electroconvulsive treatment.”40 On the other 
hand, the Colorado statute does not require physicians 
to discuss the nature, degree, duration, and probabil-
ity of the side effects and significant risks of alternative 
treatments.
While abortion mandates are not as exceptional as 
some writers suggest, abortion exceptionalism makes 
sense to a certain extent — abortion entails an action 
that will end the life of a fetus and the potential life of 
a child.41 When a potential life is ended, greater care 
should be taken than for medical decisions that have 
less serious implications. Consider in this regard that 
when state legislatures have authorized physician “aid 
in dying,”42 they have imposed a number of require-
ments that can make it difficult for patients to exercise 
their aid-in-dying right. For example, patients must 
endure a two-week waiting period between the time of 
their first request for aid in dying and their ability to 
receive a prescription for a lethal dose of drug.43 They 
also must see a second physician for confirmation of 
their eligibility for aid in dying. In addition, the stat-
utes impose special disclosure requirements that are 
not seen for other medical decisions.44 For example, 
Oregon requires physicians to “inform the patient that 
he or she has an opportunity to rescind the request at 
any time and in any manner, and offer the patient an 
opportunity to rescind at the end of the 15-day waiting 
period.”45
Similarly, in states that allow mature minors to make 
health care decisions, courts may impose stricter stan-
dards for decisions whether to forgo life-sustaining 
medical treatment than for other decisions. According 
to the Illinois Supreme Court, for example, the govern-
12 journal of law, medicine & ethics
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ment’s interest in imposing its judgment on the minor 
“will vary depending upon the nature of the medical 
treatment involved. Where the health care issues are 
potentially life threatening, the State’s parens patriae 
interest is greater than if the health care matter is less 
consequential.”46 Or consider the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Jacobson v. Massachusetts47 for another 
example of greater deference to the state’s interests 
when a health care decision can result in death. In 
that case, Henning Jacobson refused to be immu-
nized against small pox, despite a local public health 
regulation requiring vaccination.48 The Supreme Court 
upheld mandatory immunization, and it did so with-
out giving any special weight to Mr. Jacobson’s auton-
omy interests. Rather than employing strict scrutiny 
or another form of heightened scrutiny, the Court 
analyzed the ordinance through rational basis review. 
According to the Court, the regulation was not so arbi-
trary or unreasonable that it should be invalidated.49
In other words, while abortion speech mandates 
seem to violate principles of equality when they 
impose disclosure requirements that are not typically 
seen elsewhere, the equality argument runs into the 
fact that abortion really is different in a very meaning-
ful way from other medical procedures. It would be 
surprising if the rules for abortion were the same as 
the rules for an appendectomy.50
As the different examples of health care speech man-
dates indicate, there often are good reasons for legisla-
tures to require specific disclosures of information by 
physicians. Common law principles of informed con-
sent generally work well to protect patients, but not 
always. And this is particularly the case in the many 
states that rely on professional standards to define the 
scope of the physician’s duty to disclose information to 
their patients.51 Doctors are very much devoted to the 
welfare of their patients, but their own interests may 
interfere with their duty to serve their patients’ inter-
ests.52 Accordingly, we should expect that at times, the 
common law may not compel adequate disclosures by 
physicians to their patients.53
Of course, legislative mandates for informed con-
sent will not always reflect a genuine effort to insure 
that physicians disclose all material information to 
their patients. At times, as is the case with some of 
the abortion mandates, legislators will be trying to 
prevent patients from making a disfavored decision. 
Accordingly, courts need standards by which to dis-
tinguish legitimate speech mandates from illegitimate 
speech mandates.
The Supreme Court has required 
that mandated speech be truthful 
and not misleading.54 Are there 
speech mandates that are truthful 
and not misleading, but neverthe-
less are problematic? We can turn 
to some examples of mandated 
abortion speech to answer this 
question.
Speech Mandates for Abortion
At one time, speech mandates for abortion were lim-
ited and covered ground that was quite consistent 
with principles of informed consent. For example, in 
the law challenged in Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, Pennsylvania required 
physicians to provide material medical information 
about abortion and the alternative of childbirth.55 
Before an abortion, pregnant women were to be told 
about the nature of the proposed abortion procedure 
and its risks, the risks with carrying the fetus to term, 
and the probable gestational age of the fetus.56 All of 
these requirements would make for a more informed 
decision about the woman’s choice. Patients typically 
want to know about benefits and risks of a proposed 
procedure, as well as the benefits and risks of alter-
native treatments. The gestational age of the fetus 
would affect the risks from abortion, and it also might 
influence a woman’s choice about abortion. For some 
women, it may be easier to abort a very young fetus 
than an older fetus.57
Under the Pennsylvania law, women also were to 
be told that information was available about agen-
cies that offered alternatives to abortion, that medi-
cal assistance benefits might be available to defray the 
costs of pregnancy and childbirth, and that the father 
might be responsible for child support payments.58 In 
other words, to the extent that financial considerations 
were relevant to the woman’s decision, she was able to 
better understand the economic trade-offs between 
abortion and childbirth.
The Casey Court upheld the disclosure require-
ments on the grounds that they mandated information 
The Supreme Court has required that mandated 
speech be truthful and not misleading. Are there 
speech mandates that are truthful and not misleading, 
but nevertheless are problematic? We can turn to 
some examples of mandated abortion speech to 
answer this question.
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that was truthful and non-misleading and that would 
make for a fully informed decision by the woman.59 
Although the holding represented a departure from 
the Court’s past rejection of speech mandates for abor-
tion,60 the Casey Court’s approach fits well under the 
doctrine of informed consent.
In the past few years, however, some states have 
adopted speech mandates that are not based on tra-
ditional principles of informed consent. As discussed 
above, a number of legislatures have required physi-
cians to disclose information that is inaccurate. For 
example, when women are told that having an abor-
tion will increase their risk of suicide, they are being 
misled. Accordingly, a suicide risk mandate cannot 
be justified under principles of informed consent and 
should be found to violate the First Amendment.61 
Other misleading mandates include information that 
abortion is linked with an increased risk of breast 
cancer.62
In addition to misleading speech, many states 
require ideological speech. South Dakota and some 
other states require physicians to tell patients that an 
abortion will “terminate the life of a whole, separate, 
unique, living human being.”63 This mandate forces 
the physician to take sides on moral questions that 
are very much disputed. For example, there is much 
debate on the question whether the fetus is a “sepa-
rate” entity or is part of the woman. Similarly, there is 
considerable controversy on the question whether the 
fetus has the status of a “human being” or is morally 
different from an infant.
Ideological speech mandates should fall outside the 
informed consent carve out for compelled speech.64 
They do not serve the goals of ensuring that patients 
understand the benefits and risks of abortion or the 
alternative of childbirth. Rather, they require physi-
cians to promote the state’s views on the propriety of 
a controversial public policy. As the Supreme Court 
wrote in West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette,65 no government official may try to “pre-
scribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, 
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens 
to confess by word or act their faith therein.”66 Accord-
ingly, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected a wom-
an’s informed consent claim that her physician should 
have told her before her abortion that her embryo 
“was a complete, separate, unique and irreplaceable 
human being,” or that abortion involves “killing an 
existing human being.”67
Moreover, with ideological speech mandates, the 
government can exploit the trust of patients in their 
physicians to lend credibility to its message.68 And 
that corrupts the fiduciary relationship between 
patient and physician. Patients rely on physicians for 
their expertise and judgment with the understanding 
that physicians will use their expertise and judgment 
to promote the interests of their patients.69 With ideo-
logical speech mandates, the government forces physi-
cians to use their expertise and judgment to promote 
the interests of the state. We would not want Congress 
or the Obama administration to compel physicians to 
advocate on behalf of the right to health care under the 
Affordable Care Act when informing their patients. 
Similarly, legislatures should not require physicians to 
advocate against a right to abortion. In other words, 
the ideological speech mandates for abortion are akin 
to the compelled speech struck down by the Supreme 
Court in Wooley v. Maynard.70
To be sure, as the Casey Court indicated, the state 
need not remain silent about the woman’s decision 
whether to abort or carry her fetus to term. The state is 
entitled to try to persuade pregnant women to choose 
childbirth. But when it tries to do so with ideological 
speech, it must do so without forcing physicians — or 
other individuals — to deliver its message.
Interpretive Issues
While the principles of truthful speech mandates and 
non-ideological mandates provide good standards, 
they suffer from the usual imprecision of legal stan-
dards. Judges can come to different conclusions about 
the application of speech mandate standards, and 
indeed they have applied the standards in different 
ways.
Consider, for example, the contrast between the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit’s 2008 
opinion in Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, North 
Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds71 and the 2014 opin-
ion in National Association of Manufacturers v. SEC72 
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. In 
both cases, plaintiffs challenged speech mandates 
on grounds that the mandates compelled ideological 
speech. The D.C. Circuit gave the government much 
less leeway than did the Eighth Circuit on the ideo-
logical speech question.
The D.C. Circuit issued its decision in the context 
of disclosures to consumers by sellers of goods. In 
National Association of Manufacturers, the court 
rejected a speech mandate for producers of goods that 
use the kinds of minerals that are mined in the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo. Congress was concerned 
about the extent to which armed groups fighting each 
other in the Congo war were financing their operations 
with gold and other minerals from eastern Congo.73 
Accordingly, users of minerals that could have come 
from the Congo were required to determine whether 
their minerals did in fact come from the Congo. If so, 
they were required to disclose on their websites that 
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their products were not free from minerals mined in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo.74 In the govern-
ment’s view, it was simply requiring companies to 
make a factual disclosure about the components of 
their goods — were the minerals from the Congo, or 
were they from other countries? Indeed, country of 
origin disclosures are common for other businesses. 
For example, federal law requires groceries to disclose 
the country of origin of the meats, fish, fruits, vegeta-
bles, and nuts that they sell.75 Nevertheless, the D.C. 
Circuit viewed the mandate as demanding ideologi-
cal speech and therefore found the disclosure require-
ment unconstitutional under the First Amendment. 
In effect, wrote the court, a company subject to the 
requirement had “to tell consumers that its products 
are ethically tainted.” The mandate required a busi-
ness to assume “moral responsibility for the Congo 
war” even in the case of a company that “condemns 
the atrocities of the Congo war in the strongest terms” 
and “may disagree with that assessment of its moral 
responsibility.”76
If manufacturers cannot be forced to weigh in on 
the morality of Congo minerals, one would expect 
that physicians cannot be forced to weigh in on the 
morality of abortion. Yet the Eighth Circuit permit-
ted South Dakota’s ideological mandate in Rounds. 
South Dakota requires physicians to tell their abor-
tion patients that the abortion “will terminate the life 
of a whole, separate, unique, living human being.”77 In 
the court’s view, this mandate entailed factual rather 
than ideological speech because the statute included 
a definition of “human being” in the definitions sec-
tion of the law, according to which human being 
means an “individual living member of the species of 
Homo sapiens, including the unborn human being 
during the entire embryonic and fetal ages from fer-
tilization to full gestation.”78 Of course, South Dakota 
does not require physicians to include the statutory 
definition of human being in their disclosures, and 
even if physicians discuss the statutory definition, 
it still represents ideological speech — that a fetus 
is a human being.79 If the Congo minerals mandate 
was ideological, surely the human being mandate is 
ideological.80
Just as courts differ on the meaning of ideologi-
cal speech, they differ on the meaning of misleading 
speech. Consider an internal disagreement in the 
Eight Circuit in a challenge to South Dakota’s man-
date regarding the risks of suicide from abortion. 
As mentioned earlier, South Dakota requires physi-
cians to disclose “all known medical risks” of abor-
tion, including the existence of an “[i]ncreased risk of 
suicide ideation and suicide.”81 Because studies have 
not found that having an abortion increases the risk 
for suicide, a three-judge panel of the Eighth Circuit 
concluded that the provision “violates doctors’ First 
Amendment right to be free from compelled speech 
that is untruthful, misleading, or irrelevant.”82 How-
ever, sitting en banc, the Eighth Circuit reversed the 
panel and upheld the suicide risk mandate. Accord-
ing to the en banc majority, stating that there is an 
“increased risk” of suicide among women who have 
had an abortion does not mean that there is a causal 
relationship between abortion and suicide. Rather, 
wrote the majority, an increased risk is an appropriate 
way to characterize an association, and there was evi-
dence to support the claim that there is a statistically 
significant correlation between having an abortion 
and having an increased risk of suicide.83
It is difficult to square the en banc court’s opinion 
with the requirement that speech mandates not mis-
lead. Women told that there is an increased risk of 
suicide with abortion are likely to incorrectly conclude 
that having an abortion will increase their risk of sui-
cide rather than correctly concluding that women who 
choose an abortion have a higher risk of suicide for 
other reasons.
Sufficient Standards for Permissible 
Abortion Speech Mandates 
If the requirements for truthful speech mandates and 
non-ideological mandates can be manipulated, should 
other standards be added to limit the ability of legis-
latures to violate principles of informed consent and 
freedom of speech? Additional distinctions raise their 
own concerns. Moreover, they would be subject to the 
same problem of judicial manipulation.
What other standards might be invoked to reject 
speech mandates for abortion? For example, is it a 
problem if the state takes sides on a matter that is con-
troversial?84 Is it a problem if the state tries to manip-
ulate a woman’s decision making process by appealing 
to emotion? Is it a problem if the government requires 
health care providers to show graphic images to preg-
nant women before an abortion?85
That information takes sides, is designed to appeal 
to emotion, or is presented in a graphic fashion should 
not automatically disqualify a speech mandate. In 
many cases, such information can promote better 
decision making. Some mandates for biased, emotion-
laden, or graphic information are problematic, but they 
usually are problematic because they require untruth-
ful or misleading speech or because they require ide-
ological speech.86 There may be some limits on the 
degree to which a speech mandate takes sides, appeals 
to emotions, or is graphic, but a mandate should not 
be rejected simply because it takes sides, may appeal to 
emotion rather than reason, or is graphic. 
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Taking Sides
Perhaps it is wrong for the government to favor one 
choice over another. If the government tries to influ-
ence the woman’s decision, it does not seem respectful 
of the woman’s autonomy. Under Roe v. Wade,87 the 
Supreme Court required the government to remain 
neutral about a woman’s decision whether to abort 
her fetus. The Court therefore rejected many informed 
consent mandates on the ground that the state was 
trying to influence the woman’s decision in favor of 
childbirth.88 In Casey, the Court concluded that the 
state need not remain neutral, but was free to promote 
an interest in the preservation of fetal life, as long as 
its speech mandates were truthful and not mislead-
ing.89 Did the Casey Court wrongly reverse course on 
this question?
If the Court returned to its pre-Casey doctrine and 
prohibited speech mandates that reflect an effort by 
government to influence individual decision mak-
ing, most health-related speech mandates would be 
suspect.90 Governments often pass speech mandates 
precisely because they worry about the decisions that 
people make. Nutritional labeling mandates have 
been adopted because lawmakers think that many 
people make poor choices about their diet. Tobacco 
warnings have been required for cigarette manufac-
turers because lawmakers think that many people 
make poor choices about smoking. Lawmakers adopt 
speech mandates because they believe that consumers 
would make better choices if they had more informa-
tion about their decisions.
Of course, what it means to make a “better” choice 
is an important question. Let us assume it means a 
choice that the person would want to make if the per-
son truly understood all that was at stake with the 
decision.91 For example, a consumer would forgo a 
food option once the person realized how much fat, 
how many calories, or how much salt the food con-
tained. Or a consumer would abstain from smoking 
once the person realized that tobacco causes cancer. 
With health-related speech mandates, the govern-
ment can help people make decisions that better 
reflect their preferences. And one can make the same 
argument about abortion speech mandates. A woman 
worried about her finances may not feel that she can-
not afford to raise a child. But when informed about 
the father’s obligation to provide support, she might 
decide she could afford childrearing.
It should not be a problem simply because the gov-
ernment tries to influence people’s decisions by requir-
ing that they be given more information by companies 
or physicians. For example, it should not be a problem 
if a state requires physicians to provide truthful infor-
mation about support services for new mothers in the 
hope that more women will choose childbirth over 
abortion. Nor should it be a problem if a state requires 
cigarette manufacturers to provide truthful informa-
tion about the health risks of tobacco in the hope that 
fewer people will smoke.
Rather, it is a problem if the government misleads 
the public in its efforts to influence personal decision 
making or compels others to deliver speech that is ide-
ological in nature. Thus, for example, the Constitution 
should prevent states from trying to discourage abor-
tion by forcing physicians to provide inaccurate infor-
mation, such as claims that an abortion will increase 
the woman’s risk of suicide or breast cancer. The Con-
stitution also should prevent states from trying to dis-
courage abortion by forcing physicians to voice the 
government’s view about the moral status of a fetus. 
In other words, concerns about the government tak-
ing sides are already addressed by the standards that 
speech mandates may require only truthful and non-
misleading information and that the mandates not 
require ideological speech.92
Manipulating Emotions
If the doctrine of informed consent is designed to 
ensure that patients make their decisions after care-
fully considering the advantages and disadvantages of 
their options, we might worry if decisions are driven 
by emotion rather than reason.93 Emotional factors 
might result in a patient forgoing the choice that best 
reflects the patient’s genuine preferences. Should 
If the doctrine of informed consent is designed to ensure that patients make 
their decisions after carefully considering the advantages and disadvantages 
of their options, we might worry if decisions are driven by emotion rather than 
reason. Emotional factors might result in a patient forgoing the choice that best 
reflects the patient’s genuine preferences. Should speech mandates therefore  
be prohibited if they would exploit the emotions of the listeners or viewers?
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speech mandates therefore be prohibited if they would 
exploit the emotions of the listeners or viewers?
In the context of abortion, Carol Sanger has criti-
cized mandates to show ultrasound images to preg-
nant women. According to Sanger, these mandates try 
to overpower the woman’s reason by “triggering some-
thing like a primitive maternal instinct.”94 Ultrasound 
images are more likely, argues Sanger, to distort judg-
ment than to inform it.95 Caroline Corbin also worries 
that ultrasound images can distort the decision mak-
ing process. For both Sanger and Corbin, the social 
significance of a fetal ultrasound image in the United 
States is the image of an infant — of the pregnant 
woman’s child.96 As a result, the decision to abort one’s 
fetus may feel more like a decision to kill one’s baby.97
Appeals to emotion cannot be categorically rejected.98 
All decision making reflects the intersection of reason 
and emotion.99 Indeed, emotion and reason are both 
required to make decisions — “the ability to decide 
depends upon the ability to feel.”100 This is because
emotions help us to interpret, organize, and 
prioritize the information that bombards us.…
We cannot function without creating markers 
of saliency and value, and our emotions aid us 
in identifying which information is especially 
salient, valuable, or urgent.…In short, emo-
tions help shape the…cognitive tools that are 
essential to the continuing task of information 
processing.101
Moreover, objections based on appeals to emotion can 
have the undesirable effect of suggesting that women 
are untrustworthy decision makers because of their 
emotional vulnerability.102 
While there are few studies on the question, pub-
lished data suggest that the viewing of ultrasound 
images can actually play a positive role for women 
undergoing abortion. In a Canadian study, for example, 
women were given the option of viewing the ultrasound 
images as the procedure was being performed, and 
more than 70 percent of the women chose to view.103 
Among those who viewed the ultrasound, viewing did 
not make the abortion more difficult emotionally for 
more than 83 percent of the women.104 Indeed, typi-
cal comments from the women indicated that viewing 
the ultrasound made it easier for them to undergo the 
abortion.105 In another study that was conducted in 
South Africa, half of the women that participated were 
offered the opportunity to view the ultrasound while 
it was being performed.106 Among those who viewed 
the ultrasound, nearly three-fourths said they would 
want to view the ultrasound if they needed an abor-
tion in the future.107 These positive data may reflect the 
fact that the overwhelming percentage of abortions are 
performed in the first trimester. Women may expect 
to see a miniature baby on the ultrasound, but all that 
may be present is a gestational sac.108
In another study, with a much larger number of 
participants109 and that was conducted in the United 
States (Planned Parenthood in Los Angeles), research-
ers examined whether viewing an ultrasound would 
change women’s minds about abortion.110 At the clin-
ics studied, ultrasounds were routinely performed, 
and patients were offered the opportunity to view 
the ultrasound. More than 40 percent of the women 
chose to view the ultrasound, and for the most part, 
viewing did not affect the decision whether to abort.111 
However, for the 7 percent of women who came to the 
clinic with a low to medium level of certainty about 
having an abortion, there appeared to be a small effect 
on their decision making in the direction of carrying 
the fetus to term.112
More studies are needed to inform the question, 
but the data to date suggest that it makes sense for 
physicians to offer women the opportunity to view 
their ultrasounds when they are having ultrasounds 
performed. A substantial minority, if not a majority, 
of women want to view the ultrasound, the viewing is 
generally a positive experience, and for a small number 
of women who are uncertain whether to have an abor-
tion, the ultrasound may influence their thinking.113
If we cannot reject appeals to emotion as a general 
matter, or even the specific appeal of an ultrasound 
image, can we reject some appeals to emotion because 
they are too extreme? Once again, we come back to 
the standard that speech mandates must be truthful 
and non-misleading. Emotional appeals that rely on 
deception are not acceptable.114
Graphic Images
Related to the concern about appeals to emotion is the 
concern about the use of graphic images. We might 
worry that powerful images can be overly persuasive by 
leading viewers to ignore important factual information. 
It is difficult to see why legal doctrine should distin-
guish between dry text and graphic images. The goal 
of informed consent doctrine is to ensure that patients 
develop a meaningful understanding of their options 
before making a decision. And many people will more 
readily understand information that is delivered 
graphically — sometimes a picture really is worth a 
thousand words. Hence, Congress passed legislation 
in 2009 requiring the traditional textual warnings on 
cigarette packages to be paired with images that illus-
trate the harms of smoking,115 and many states require 
physicians to offer women the opportunity to view pic-
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tures of fetuses or images from their own fetal ultra-
sound before an abortion.116
Whether in the context of smoking or abortion, 
graphic images can provide a better understanding 
of the considerations important to the person’s deci-
sion. For abortion, it will be relevant for many women 
whether the fetus is still a blob of tissue or has devel-
oped many of the features of a person. An abortion 
at six weeks can be a very different decision than an 
abortion at eighteen weeks. As discussed in the pre-
ceding section, ultrasound images often can serve the 
purposes of informed consent.117
But is there a problem if images are too graphic? 
Should women really be confronted with ultrasounds 
of their fetuses before an abortion? After all, we do not 
expect patients to view videotapes of heart surgery before 
they undergo their own operations.118 Perhaps an image 
mandate would be designed for its shock value rather 
than for its ability to convey factual information.119
On the other hand, we can imagine some very 
graphic images that would be desirable. Consider a 
hypothetical informed consent statute for immuni-
zation. In recent years, the United States has seen a 
significant increase in the incidence of childhood dis-
eases that are preventable with vaccines (e.g., measles 
and chicken pox). These increases reflect the fact 
that parents are more likely than in the past to refuse 
immunizations for their children. To some extent, 
the willingness to reject immunization reflects the 
success of immunization in nearly eliminating once-
common childhood communicable diseases. Because 
parents today are far less familiar than were genera-
tions past with the impact of these infections,120 they 
may discount the benefits of vaccination. Moreover, 
they may discount the benefits not only for their own 
children but also for individuals who cannot be vac-
cinated because of compromised immune function 
or other medical conditions.121 Suppose, then, that a 
state wanted to address the declining rate of immu-
nization by requiring pediatricians to show parents 
graphic images of people with the illness the immu-
nization protects against. Suppose in particular that 
the images included cases in which an immunocom-
promised individual dies from chicken pox or measles. 
If the images would more effectively communicate to 
the parents the importance of immunization, then it 
is difficult to see why the images should be prohibited.
To be sure, some graphic images may be problematic. 
In particular, graphic images can mislead patients. 
For example, if an ultrasound image of a woman’s 
fetus is magnified so that it appears to be larger than 
its actual size, as is often the case with first-trimester 
pregnancies, the pregnant woman would be given an 
inaccurate sense of the fetus’ nature.122 One can gener-
ally protect against inappropriate graphic images by 
requiring that they be truthful and not misleading.
It is possible to imagine graphic images that would be 
accurate but unacceptable. For example, suppose a leg-
islature required women to watch a video of a physician 
dismembering a fetus during an abortion. But images 
that extreme have not been mandated. If such a mandate 
were enacted, then it would be necessary to establish a 
standard for identifying images that are too graphic. 
Conclusion
As I have discussed, courts can draw a good balance 
between principles of informed consent and the First 
Amendment by ensuring that abortion speech mandates 
are truthful, not misleading, and not ideological. Some 
courts have not employed these standards with sufficient 
bite, as when the Eighth Circuit permitted misleading 
statements about the risk of suicide from abortion, but 
the answer to that problem is for the Supreme Court to 
insist that the standards be applied more rigorously.
In that regard, a number of scholars have criticized 
courts for their differential treatment of speech man-
dates for companies and speech mandates for abortion 
providers.123 For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit struck down the Food and Drug 
Administration’s proposed graphic warnings for ciga-
As I have discussed, courts can draw a good balance between principles  
of informed consent and the First Amendment by ensuring that abortion 
speech mandates are truthful, not misleading, and not ideological. Some 
courts have not employed these standards with sufficient bite, as when the 
Eighth Circuit permitted misleading statements about the risk of suicide  
from abortion, but the answer to that problem is for the Supreme Court  
to insist that the standards be applied more rigorously.
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rette packages124 while the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit upheld Texas’ ultrasound image view-
ing statute.125 There were good reasons for the tobacco 
warnings, and they should have been upheld.126
As the examples from corporate speech and physician 
speech illustrate, there are problems with both overen-
forcement and underenforcement of the requirements 
that speech mandates be truthful, not misleading, and 
not ideological. Unfortunately, in its approach to speech 
mandates for tobacco companies — or its approach on 
the Congo minerals disclosure127 — the D.C. Circuit did 
not give the government sufficient leeway to require 
informational disclosures (the overenforcement prob-
lem). On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit (and the 
Eighth Circuit128) have given government too much 
authority to impose disclosures in the context of abor-
tion speech mandates (the underenforcement prob-
lem). Accordingly, when it next addresses the question 
of speech mandates that are designed to better inform 
the public, the Supreme Court needs to provide suffi-
cient guidance to avoid problems of both overenforce-
ment and underenforcement.
But adding new standards to supplement the stan-
dards regarding truth and ideology will not be useful. 
Additional standards would give weight to the wrong 
factors, and in any event, would be the subject to the 
same problems of overenforcement and underenforce-
ment that currently exist with appropriate standards 
for judging speech mandates.129
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